

A Study in Forgery

By
SCAËVOLA

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INTRODUCTION

In the good old times of yore when life was simpler though not so civilised, conquests were effected with the utmost straightforwardness. After the usual slaughter, the victor did not ask the conquered what rulers they would like to have, or under what political system they would feel most efficient and happy. He simply incorporated the vanquished nation into his realm and appointed a lieutenant to rule it as his pleasure dictated.

Impartiality compels us to acknowledge that there was a certain charm about conquest in the days of yore. There was no hypocritical concealment of the true character of the operation, and the victor was not a busybody who would take pains to show that his deed was in accordance with the will of his newly acquired people. Not only that. Not infrequently he even contented himself with formal incorporation, and, provided his lieutenant was not a tyrant by nature, they both let the conquered people or tribe continue to live more or less as they wished, retaining their gods, their set of beliefs and their specific brand of culture. In such cases, not only was the conquest itself more straightforward than nowadays but sometimes the results thereof had a more superficial character.

The modern civilised world has repudiated war and conquest. Our delicate comprehension of other peoples' rights, our attachment to our own freedom and respect for the individual character of every man and every nation, cannot but shudder at the mere thought of conquest and war. The rulers have followed suit in their own peculiar way.

More refined methods of conquest have been invented so as to avoid direct clashes with all the fine feelings engendered by the progress of culture and civilisation. At the same time, the consequences of the conquest have been made to reach deeper into the life of the conquered.

The conquerors have decided, in a tacit world-wide understanding, that conquest should henceforth be effected from within, and that the utmost care should be taken to gather

proof that it was in full accordance with the desires and wishes of the conquered. The conquest was to be made, as it were, on behalf of the conquered, and in the full glory of Democracy. The appearances of national independence were to be preserved. However, the conquered state's political, economic and social system was to undergo deep and radical changes, ruthlessly eliminating all elements unable to adapt themselves to the new structure.

The modern technique of conquest was applied for the first time when two new republics, Tuva and Outer Mongolia, were carved out of Chinese territory on the border of the U.S.S.R.

Visitors to the Metropole Hotel in Moscow can admire delegations in Mongolian dress and in Soviet officers' uniforms, arriving from time to time in the capital of the Soviet Empire, after a long journey from their native lands. In accordance with their Oriental customs they bring gifts for Soviet dignitaries, and thoroughly enjoy the opportunity of visiting what in their opinion is the most modern capital of the world. After a few weeks' stay in Moscow, they leave for home. In the meantime, new gifts are collected, and a new delegation prepares for the same journey.

The chief duty of these countries consists in supplying certain contingents of recruits of whom more will probably be heard when the European chapter of the present war comes to a close, and when the Asiatic chapter unfolds itself in full. Needless to add, both Mongol republics are "people's republics," independent and free.

The story of the conquest of Manchuria by Japan and of the subsequent formation of an "independent" Manchukuo is also very illuminating.

It began in September, 1931, when the Japanese availed themselves of an "incident" whose true origin has never been satisfactorily established. After protracted fighting, which, in view of the vast areas involved, took many months, the Japanese found puppets willing to pose as representatives of the Manchu people, and soon had the impudence to assert

before the League of Nations that the annexation of Manchukuo territory was a measure of self-defence, and that the new State of Manchukuo had been founded by the spontaneous will of the people (cf., Japanese note of February 27th, 1933). This "spontaneous will" has been best described in the Lytton Report, according to which the Japanese "made use of the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals, and took advantage of certain minorities among the inhabitants, who had grievances against the former (i.e., Chinese, not ours) Administration.

At first the world did not grasp the import of this new method of conquest. Only when it was applied in the very heart of the civilised world was it understood. Adolf Hitler improved upon it, although, as applied by him, it did not yet attain the acme of perfection. A Fifth Column was created, recruited mostly from German minorities, with the task of undermining States from within. It was proved that, in order to effect a conquest, it was not indispensable to use military force or to organise a revolution. By the mere threat of force, Hitler was able to seize Austria, Czechoslovakia and the Memel area. Direct incorporation, division, preservation of a shadow independence under a Protector's rule, or even, as in the case of Slovakia, fictitious independence, were the procedures adopted. All these conquests—as Hitler himself boasted—were effected without bloodshed. We may add that from the strictly formal point of view they were effected according to the letter of the law and in virtue of the alleged consent of the nations concerned and their parliaments.

The method was further perfected when the three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were conquered. Communist parties representing less than 1 per cent. of the people here assumed the role of the Fifth Column. In that capacity these parties are superior to the German minorities in Hitler's employ, since people of all nationalities, races and creeds may join them, and since the dynamite they use is not of such poor quality as that of *Mein Kampf*. The struggle

they wage is—so they allege—a struggle for the liberation of the working man. The incorporation of a State into the Soviet Union is only an unforeseen and subsequent by-product of political and social evolution. True, in all cases Russia also had to use military force, but—as it was later demonstrated through plebiscites—enthusiastic meetings and the unanimous resolutions of the parliaments of these countries—it was the “people” itself that had called upon the Red Army divisions to help destroy “native reaction.” The conquest thus brought about was full and complete. The countries concerned carried out fundamental changes in their social and political structure and, almost overnight, became enthusiastic admirers of a new unknown system and reorganised their life accordingly.

History went on. One after another the new creatures of Nazi barbarism and perfidy were emerging in the process of the subjugation of Europe. Quisling, Degrelle, Moravec, Laval and many others made their appearance in the forefront of decay. The free world slowly realised what system was being introduced and what it meant. This realisation found its true expression in the Atlantic Charter, this confession of faith of the nations fighting for democracy, justice, equal distribution of wealth, progress and freedom. The first three articles of the Charter contain principles which, if they crystallise into reality, may well render impossible future wars and mutual extermination among the inhabitants of the globe now so essentially one.

It is against this general background that the story that has been told in these pages has to be read and understood. Poland is one of the many countries which have recently experienced the new technique of conquest. She is one of the many nations that desire real freedom and not the pretence of it. The story told is one of forgery. We hope that it may be useful both as a study in history and in the modern perverted ways of political behaviour.

London, March, 1945.

CHAPTER I

AN UNFINISHED PRELUDE

Few of our readers still remember the war that raged in 1919 and 1920 between Poland and Soviet Russia for the possession of a vast stretch of lands between the Bug and the Dnieper, which up to the Partitions of the XVIII century had been for four hundred years in the possession of Poland, acquired mainly through voluntary union with the ancient Duchy of Lithuania, and which had a strong admixture of Polish population, very marked in the West, less so towards the East.

In the summer of 1920, during the Soviet offensive directed against Warsaw, a group of Polish Communists was organised behind the Russian lines to play the role of a Soviet-sponsored authority in Poland. This group proclaimed itself at Białystok a " Polish Provisional Revolutionary Government."

Feliks Dzierżyński, the famous head of the Soviet Cheka (now NKVD), Feliks Kon, Julian Marchlewski and Alfred Lampe, were its most prominent leaders.

Soon, the would-be rulers of a future Soviet Poland started organising an army of their own, and issued in bad Polish a fiery proclamation to the Polish soldiers. The proclamation ran as follows :

" Polish Soldiers ! . . . The Red Army entering Polish territory is not guided by imperialist greed. It brings the working people of Poland help to fight for liberation from under the yoke of the nobility and the bourgeoisie. It is fully conscious that only a workers' and peasants' Poland can protect Soviet Russia from the greed of Polish and foreign imperialist aggressors. Fighting for its own freedom it also fights for ours. We extend our welcome to the Red Army who is not our enemy but a brother happier than ourselves because he has already been liberated. Our main task at present is to join forces with the Red Army and jointly conquer our common enemy. This is our duty towards the working people of Poland.

We call upon you to fulfil this duty! Form Soldiers' Councils! Take prisoner your officers and hasten to Warsaw together with the Red Army, so as to save from destruction whatever may yet be saved after the landlords' rule. Every wasted moment threatens thousands of people with death from starvation! To deeds, comrades! Fulfil your duty! Proletarians unite with proletarians against exploiters. Let a Polish Red Army keep pace with the Russian Red Army in the grand struggle for the liberation of the working people!

Be quick, workers and peasants. We call you to a great deed, to the "final struggle" against the world of exploitation!

However, soon they were bitterly disappointed. The peasantry, the workers and the working intelligentsia of Poland, showed by their attitude that they did not want social reform on the Communist pattern and internal bloodshed after the Russian fashion. Not only that. Called for the defence of the country by their acknowledged Peasant Party and Socialist leaders, they flocked en masse to the ranks of the Polish Army, to repel the foreign invasion.

In mid-August, 1920, the Red Army was defeated at the outskirts of Warsaw, and repulsed much further east.

On October 12th, 1920, a preliminary treaty of peace was signed between Poland and Soviet Russia-Ukraine, to be replaced on March 18th, 1921, by a final treaty, known as "the Treaty of Riga."

We may be excused for quoting here also a similar manifesto issued, in equally bad Polish, to Polish soldiers on September 17th, 1939, by the C-in-C. of the Byelorussian Front, Army Commander Kovalev. The analogy is striking:

"Soldiers of the Polish Army!

The Polish landlords and bourgeois Government which has dragged you into an adventurers' war, has shamelessly disintegrated. It turned out incapable of governing the country and of organising defence.... The Polish Army has suffered a severe defeat from which it is unable to disentangle itself. Death from starvation and destruction threatens your wives, children, brothers and sisters.

.... Do not resist the Red Army of Workers and Peasants. Your resistance will not be of any avail to you, and will expose you to destruction. We are coming not as your conquerors but as your class brethren and liberators from the big landlords' and capitalists' oppression.

The great and invincible Red Army brings the working people brotherhood and a happy life inscribed on its banners.

Soldiers of the Polish Army! Do not shed blood in vain, in defence of the interests of the landlords and the capitalists, alien to you!.... Give up weapons! Come over to the Red Army. Your freedom and life are assured."

A frontier line was then agreed upon after prolonged discussions, which left with Russia the main Ukrainian and White Ruthenian (Byelorussian) territories.

A period of peace ensued between the two neighbouring states. The members of the " Polish Provisional Revolutionary Government " returned to Russia, which had already been their spiritual and actual fatherland for quite a long time, and were allotted other tasks by the Soviet Government. The most famous amongst them, Feliks Dzierżyński, as head of the much dreaded Cheka reverted to his job of tracing and eliminating the enemies of the Soviet State. He is usually rightly ranked amongst its foremost founders.

Whether they cared for it or not, most of them were never to see Poland again.

PART I

CHAPTER II

"TWO SWIFT BLOWS"

In a speech delivered on October 31st, 1939, at the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., M. V. Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, then also Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, said *inter alia* :—

" . . . one swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty. . . . "†

Let us note in passing that unmistakable emotion rang out in the words of M. Molotov, and that a feeling of delight was discernible in his phrasing.

This, however, is none of our concern here. All that is of interest to us is that the passage quoted from M. Molotov's speech undoubtedly constituted the point of departure for future Soviet policy towards Poland. In Soviet eyes, Poland had become a " nothing," and a " something " was to be found instead to fill up the political vacuum created by the armies of Poland's two giant neighbours.

Such was the Soviet attitude. The less picturesque language of the Soviet note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow dated September 17th, 1939, summed it up in a more formal manner, alleging that " the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist."†

* Cf. p. 27, *Soviet Peace Policy, Four Speeches by V. Molotov*, with a Foreword by D. N. Pritt, K.C., M.P., and Biographical Sketch by W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, published for the Anglo-Russian News Bulletin by Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., London, first published 1941, pp. 101.

† Cf. p. 189, *Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939*. The Polish White Book published by authority of the Polish Government by Roy Publishers, New York, pp. 222.

However, no justification could be found for this view in the realities of the situation. On September 17th, when the Red Army entered Poland and when the Soviet note was handed, the Polish armies were still fighting. The official Nazi army gazette, published by the German High Command (*Heeres-Verordnungsblatt, herausgegeben vom Oberkommando des Heeres*), issue of January 2nd, 1940, mentioned as the last battle with the Polish Army on Polish territory the battle of Kock-Adamów (Central Poland) of October 2nd-7th, 1939, and laid down that those who took part in the Polish Campaign should receive the following entry in their military record books: "Campaign against Poland, September 1st, 1939, till October 7th, 1939." On the Soviet side, an operational communiqué was issued by the General Headquarters of the Red Army as late as September 28th, 1939, in which the liquidation of a number of Polish Army units, including five cavalry regiments was announced.

On September 17th, the Polish Government was still functioning on Polish soil controlling an area of about 77,000 square miles, i.e., slightly over half the total area of Poland, inhabited permanently by 13,000,000 people to which were added many big army units and numerous refugees from the territory overrun by the Nazis. Following the Soviet attack of September 17th, the then Government of Poland crossed the frontier into Rumania. Later on, after the resignation of President Moscicki, and in accordance with the Polish Constitution, President Raczkiewicz took office on September 30th, 1939, in Paris, and a new Government headed by the late General Sikorski was sworn in. This government, later presided over by M. Mikolajczyk and now, since November 29th, 1944, by M. Arciszewski, has been recognised by all Allied and neutral Powers, and, in the period July 30th, 1941—April 25th, 1943, by the U.S.S.R. Since its formation, this Government has taken an active part in the joint war against Germany.

Thus, the Polish State had never ceased legally to exist, nor was there any ground for alleging that "nothing" had been left of Poland after the two "swift blows" of the fateful autumn of 1939.

The Soviet leaders themselves were only too well aware of the purely rhetorical character of their allegations. They were too realistic to lull themselves into a false belief that Nazi-Soviet friendship, as a result of which the two partners had each taken possession of half of Poland, would be of long duration. Sooner or later, war was bound to break out between the two states, and amongst many other problems that of Poland was bound to arise again.

"There can be no question of restoring old Poland," said M. Molotov, further in the speech quoted (*ib.* p. 29). The solution best adapted to the interests of the Soviet State and of World Communism had therefore to be worked out and prepared in advance, so as not to let events develop in undesirable directions.

In the meantime the problem of the occupied Eastern Poland awaited immediate settlement.

CHAPTER III

THE FOURTH PARTITION OF POLAND

Ranking in the period of 1386-1696 amongst the foremost powers of Europe, the ancient Polish Republic had since entered upon a path of gradual decline in political and military importance. The eighteenth century saw the quick and decisive rise of her two neighbours, Prussia and Russia. Using force, the two States effected three partitions of the Republic (1772, 1793 and 1795), the last of which brought the Republic's existence to an end. A continuation of the old Commonwealth, the modern Republic of Poland only arose in 1918, towards the end of the First World War.

September, 1939, brought about a fourth partition of Poland, by Nazi Germany, the heir of the Kingdom of Prussia, and by the U.S.S.R., the inheritor of the territories and policies of the former Tsarist Empire.

The partition treaty was concluded on September 28th, 1939, while Polish regular forces were still striving to stem the two tides, and when Poland's capital had not yet been captured by the enemy.* In virtue of the Treaty, which constituted a flagrant breach of international law, Nazi Germany took 72,866 sq. miles or 48.4 per cent. of Polish territory, whilst the Soviet Union was assigned the remaining 77,620 sq. miles or 51.6 per cent. The partition line ran along the rivers Pissa, Bug and San.

On the Bug sector it was identical with a line suggested on July 11th, 1920, by the Allied Powers as provisional demarcation pending a final settlement of relations between Poland and Soviet Russia, called the "Curzon Line." This partial identity gave rise to frequent misunderstandings in the world press which recently began to revive the forgotten term "Curzon Line" to denote what, in actual fact, ought to be called after its two creators, Molotov and Ribbentrop.

As *Pravda* of September 30th, 1939, asserted in an article written on the occasion of the conclusion of the Partition Treaty, the Ribbentrop-Molotov line was to be final.

"The boundary line between the State interests of the U.S.S.R. and Germany respectively in the territory of the former Polish State has been accurately and finally fixed. . . . The U.S.S.R. and Germany have come to a final understanding concerning the frontier, peace and order, in the territory where the interests of the two States meet."

* Cf. the last communiqué issued by the Warsaw Defence Command on September 29th; as quoted in the Polish White Book, p. 140.

aspect, in the sense that the territories covered by the sacrificial horse were brought under the political suzerainty of the king, than under the religious domination of the State concerned. The idea and ideal of *Ram Raj* had persisted right through the ages even to the present day, as something to be approximated to in terms of a purely Hindu type of social organisation and territorial politics. But I would be sceptical in dogmatically asserting whether this *Ram Raj* had the sword of religion behind it, in order that non-conformists right through the ages were brought under the common flag of a religion, supported by the panoply of power and coercion represented by a political State.

The failure of Asoka's *jihad* against Brahmanical Hinduism had apparently taught a salutary lesson to the Hindu kings right through the Christian era, in order that they might not venture into a realm of religious politics which was militant and un-compromising. It is true that even in the XVIII century King Shivaji unsheathed the sword of religion, and was successful in upholding it on behalf of the Hindus (or *Hindudom* as Veer Savarkar would like to put it) against the merciless onslaught of proselytizing Islam in India at that period of our national history. But it would be cruelly wrong to suggest that King Shivaji organised a Hindu *jihad* against Islam. On the contrary, King Shivaji's approach was more or less in terms of a counter-*jihad*, or defensive war, against the activities of the Muslim conquerors of India to stamp out the idolatrous, infidel Hindu. That is to say, the Hindu revival in

Maharashtra, which at one time spread over the length and breadth of India as a whole, had nothing to do with the conversion of the *mlechch*, which in any case is theologically unthinkable in terms of the ancient fabric of Hinduism (despite isolated recorded instances of Greeks embracing Jainism) as a religion, way of life or social organisation, but was more a conscious effort to withstand the onslaught of the incoming Muslim hordes which, in the true traditions of Ghazni and Ghorî, had sworn to stamp out non-conformity (within the meaning of Islam) wherever it had existed.

At a later stage I will be showing the manner in which the Muslim *jihad*, instead of continuing to be aggressive in character became defensive in approach to the problems of society and organisation of the State, until it had completely vanished, at any rate in the XX century, as illustrated by the national histories of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and even Afghanistan. But, as far as what I venture to term the Hindu counter-*jihad* is concerned, it is clear that the motive was not aggressive, that the method of approach was certainly not territorially militant, in the sense that it did not go beyond the territorial confines of the country inhabited by the Hindus of the period concerned, and that it was purely a gigantic effort on the part of the Hindus to preserve their religion against the openly declared *jihad* of the Muslims of the aggressive type known to history not only in India, but also in the various parts of the world, spreading from Morocco to Korea, and from Saville to Bali right through the historic period.

The British Government of India have statutorily separated the Sikhs from the Hindus for purposes of communal determination and in the hoary traditions of *divide et impera*, but despite the thinness of the distinction between a Hindu Jat, a Sikh Jat and a Muslim Jat in the Punjab these days, it is obvious that a Sikh is a Hindu to the core, conforming to the basic principles of Hinduism, though pursuing an exclusive type of living and organisation as ordained by the ten Gurus and the *Granth Sahib*. The merciless persecution by the Muslim conquerors, between the XIV and XVIII centuries, compelled the Hindus of the Punjab to group themselves together into a militant band pledged to the support and preservation of Hindu culture, tradition, social organisation and, even for that matter, purity of blood. Anyone who has gone through Macauliffe's volumes on the Sikhs would marvel at the tenacity of purpose of these Hindu protestants in withstanding the onslaughts of the superiorly equipped Muslim conquerors and rulers during these centuries, and a *paean* of approbation would be bestowed upon this small but virile community, which is the flesh of the flesh and blood of the blood of the Hindus, for having succeeded in resisting their engulfment and total religious obliteration by the early Muslim conquerors of this land. Actually, the establishment of the Sikh Kingdom culminating in the sovereignty of King Ranjit Singh would be remembered in history as a glorious example of the fruits of self-discipline and self-effort which any group of people can achieve, provided they have the

motive force of religion behind their earthly activity. No one can say that the sword of religion unsheathed by the Sikhs against Muslim persecution was or even today is an aggressive instrument for the stamping out of non-conformity wherever it existed. The Sikh conflict with Muslim hordes which surrounded this small and virile community in the Punjab was necessarily a religious war, but it was not a religious war based upon the principle of *jihad*, meaning thereby the extermination of the non-conforming *mlechh*. On the contrary, it was a last-ditch stand of a motley crowd of heroic Hindus, inspired successfully by their ten Gurus, to band together four square against the merciless and sustained onslaughts of Islam, and it must be said to the credit of the Sikhs that even persecution, of the cruel type one does not meet elsewhere in the entire annals of history, was insufficient to stamp out their achievement in the realm of man's cherished equation with his Maker. No one outside Bedlam would suggest that the religious wars of the Sikhs, or the sword of religion unsheathed by the Sikhs, during the two or three centuries before the British occupation of this country, had anything to do with aggressiveness in religion. If I may vary the metaphor again, the Sikh religious wars were defensive wars, identical with the wars waged by King Shivaji, intended for securing the *preservation* and not the expansion of Hinduism at the expense of non-conformists surrounding Hinduism.

I can go on multiplying instances of this character to further demonstrate the point that the

sword of religion was never unsheathed in the socio-political or socio-military sense as, for example, early Islam and the Holy Roman Church contrived to bring about for a thousand years after the birth of Christ. The obvious explanation for this curious twist to the extra-territorial approach of Hinduism is a simple one. Hinduism does *not* believe in conversion, and I say this in the face of the evidence supplied by numerous protestant movements within the fold of Hinduism, which sprang up almost in a crusading spirit and endeavoured to dismember the main body of the Hindus into so many sects, creeds and socio-religious groups. The *Tantrik*, the *Vaishnavite*, the *Nastik* and a host of other forms had all sprung from out of the bosom of Hinduism, whose catholicity and universality are such that they are not placed outside the pale.

It is not my purpose here to paint in glorious colours the achievements of Hinduism, demonstrating its indestructibility, but I am mentioning these simply to show that for possibly five thousand years or more—from the primitive animism of the ancient Aryans so forcibly brought out in the *Rig Veda* to the present multi-pronged type of denominationalised and institutionalised religion, ranging from the highest systems of metaphysics known to the human mind to what the Muslim would perhaps call the sheer idolatry inside a Hindu temple today—Hinduism deliberately eschewed the need for conformity within its fold and always kept, in the military sense, sheathed the sword of religion, and preserved itself as a code of religion and a way of social organisation

in which dissidents had a place of their own, in a manner which has no parallel in the history of man's religion anywhere. Occasionally, a great religious leader like Sankaracharya undertook a crusade against irreligion, or non-religion within the fold of Hinduism, but even the crusade of Sankaracharya, which must be presumed to have been taken to almost every corner of India, had not the arms of Kings and free-booters which, for example, the crusades of the early Omayyads or the Holy Roman Church had, almost at the time when Sankaracharya himself lived and sought the fulfilment of his earthly mission as one of the truest exponents of the pristine principles of Hinduism.

Hindu history and tradition draw a distinction between *Dharma* and *Adharma Yuddh*, the justified and unjustifiable wars, as between two kings or kingdoms or peoples. The battle of Kurukshetra was one of the most eloquent illustrations of this distinction between right and wrong, the appropriate and the inappropriate, and the justified and the unjustifiable wars which were legion in the historic period. The principal epics of India, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* and, even for that matter, the *Bhagavata* give us numerous illustrations of the wars of the mere mortal Hindus against the *Asuras*, the *Rakshasas* and a host of other non-conforming elements surrounding the Hindu territories, against whom incessant battle was waged by the Hindu kings. A trite example of this type of approach to statecraft, inter-statal relations and social preservation is that of the successful Hindu wars against

Banasura, Narakasura and, even for that matter Ravana. Sometimes we find occasion for a group of Hindu kings banding themselves together and marching as a solid phalanx against these non-conforming elements surrounding their kingdoms and even surrounding the earth, whose declared purpose was always stated to be the stamping out of the Hindu *Dharma* and the spoliation of Hindu society. Sometimes we find mortal kings joining hands with the celestial *Devas* for the purpose of contriving the destruction of these, shall I say, non-mortal or sub-human non-conformists, who had sworn to bring about the destruction of the cardinal principles of Hinduism. These non-conforming elements were no doubt successfully destroyed in the so-called *Dharma Yudh* of the ancient Hindu kings, but the most important point to be remembered in this connection is that there was no conversion of these non-conforming, man or sub-human elements into the Hindu fold. That is to say, whenever the religious war was waged by the Hindus, even as the religious wars were waged by King Shivaji or King Ranjit Singh, they were specifically waged for the purpose of the destruction of the Hindu system of socio-religious organisation and polity against attacks from without, for the purpose of conquering the world by absorbing the non-conforming elements into the fold of Hinduism. *Suddhi* and *tan* might have become the expedients of nineteenth century Hindu India, against the accumulation of a thousand years of forcible conversion by Islam, but it is a tenet of faith, but it would be hard even in an

allegorical sense, to discover a single instance, in the entire range of mythological and historical tradition of the Hindu, of a non-conformist being given the Hindu *Dharma* and taken into the Hindu fold.

I am not forgetting for a single moment the fact that ancient Hindu missionaries had crossed the Seven Seas, in order to carry the message of the liberalising and constructive influence of the Hindu *Dharma*. I have seen with my own eyes the vestiges of Hindu missionary enterprise in countries like Indo-China (*Kambhoj*), Siam and elsewhere through the length and breadth of South-East Asia, but this Hindu missionary enterprise of the ancient days had nothing to do with the sword of religion, in the sense that it was not a *jihad* against non-conformists or sub-human peoples wherever they existed, but that it carried light and culture and made them a votive offering at the altar of sublimated humanity, in order to lift it from the degrading conditions of non-religion or irreligion. I must, in parenthesis, refer to occasional conflicts between these newly formed Hindu settlements overseas and the lesser religions of the world, e. g., the colossal religious wars culminating in the architectural ruins of Angkor-wat in Cambodia, but this has nothing to do with any aggressive spirit of Hinduism proper, with reference to the relationship of man with man on earth, and of man with his Maker in heaven.

I must, however, take note here of the reflex effects of the concept of *Ram Raj* on the social character and the political conception of the State

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were themselves perhaps the most ardent worshippers of Shiva, who is one of the Hindu Trinity, with the result that non-conformity to prevailing conceptions of Hindu approach to life and living, even in terms of the organisation of the State, had lost most of its meaning to the "conquering heroes" of Hinduism.

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sword of religion was never unsheathed in the socio-political or socio-military sense as, for example, early Islam and the Holy Roman Church contrived to bring about for a thousand years after the birth of Christ. The obvious explanation for this curious twist to the extra-territorial approach of Hinduism is a simple one. Hinduism does *not* believe in conversion, and I say this in the face of the evidence supplied by numerous protestant movements within the fold of Hinduism, which sprang up almost in a crusading spirit and endeavoured to dismember the main body of the Hindus into so many sects, creeds and socio-religious groups. The *Tantrik*, the *Vaishnavite*, the *Nastik* and a host of other forms had all sprung from out of the bosom of Hinduism, whose catholicity and universality are such that they are not placed outside the pale.

It is not my purpose here to paint in glorious colours the achievements of Hinduism, demonstrating its indestructibility, but I am mentioning these simply to show that for possibly five thousand years or more—from the primitive animism of the ancient Aryans so forcibly brought out in the *Rig Veda* to the present multi-pronged type of denominationalised and institutionalised religion, ranging from the highest systems of metaphysics known to the human mind to what the Muslim would perhaps call the sheer idolatry inside a Hindu temple today—Hinduism deliberately eschewed the need for conformity within its fold and always kept, in the military sense, sheathed the sword of religion, and preserved itself as a code of religion and a way of social organisation

in which dissidents had a place of their own, in a manner which has no parallel in the history of man's religion anywhere. Occasionally, a great religious leader like Sankaracharya undertook a crusade against irreligion, or non-religion within the fold of Hinduism, but even the crusade of Sankaracharya, which must be presumed to have been taken to almost every corner of India, had not the arms of Kings and free-booters which, for example, the crusades of the early Omayyads or the Holy Roman Church had, almost at the time when Sankaracharya himself lived and sought the fulfilment of his earthly mission as one of the truest exponents of the pristine principles of Hinduism.

Hindu history and tradition draw a distinction between *Dharma* and *Adharma Yuddh*, the justified and unjustifiable wars, as between two kings or kingdoms or peoples. The battle of Kurukshetra was one of the most eloquent illustrations of this distinction between right and wrong, the appropriate and the inappropriate, and the justified and the unjustifiable wars which were legion in the historic period. The principal epics of India, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* and, even for that matter, the *Bhagavata* give us numerous illustrations of the wars of the mere mortal Hindus against the *Asuras*, the *Rakshasas* and a host of other non-conforming elements surrounding the Hindu territories, against whom incessant battle was waged by the Hindu kings. A trite example of this type of approach to statecraft, inter-statal relations and social preservation is that of the successful Hindu wars against

Banasura, Narakasura and, even for that matter Ravana. Sometimes we find occasion for a group of Hindu kings banding themselves together and marching as a solid phalanx against these non-conforming elements surrounding their kingdoms and even surrounding the earth, whose declared purpose was always stated to be the stamping out of the Hindu *Dharma* and the spoliation of Hindu society. Sometimes we find mortal kings joining hands with the celestial *Devas* for the purpose of contriving the destruction of these, shall I say, non-mortal or sub-human non-conformists, who had sworn to bring about the destruction of the cardinal principles of Hinduism. These non-conforming elements were no doubt successfully destroyed in the so-called *Dharma Yudh* of the ancient Hindu kings, but the most important point to be remembered in this connection is that there was no conversion of these non-conforming, non-human or sub-human elements into the Hindu fold. That is to say, whenever the religious war was waged by the Hindus, even as the religious wars were waged by King Shivaji or King Ranjit Singh, they were specifically waged for the purpose of the preservation of the Hindu system of socio-religious organisation and polity against attacks from without, and not for the purpose of conquering the world and subduing the non-conforming elements into immersion into the fold of Hinduism. *Suddhi* and *Sanghatan* might have become the expedients of XX century Hindu India, against the accumulation of a thousand years of forcible conversion by Islam as a tenet of faith, but it would be hard even in an

allegorical sense, to discover a single instance, in the entire range of mythological and historical tradition of the Hindu, of a non-conformist being given the Hindu *Dharma* and taken into the Hindu fold.

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towards which, as I have said earlier, the citizen of a State can only have reverent indifference.

It is also difficult for any honest Hindu to project his mind into the appropriate type of political State one would like to have today or tomorrow, without in some fashion or other securing, shall I say in modern legalistic form, the statutory recognition of these institutions of history. But, it is clear that, through thousands of years of historical development, even of the fully sovereign early type of Hindu socio-political organisation, tolerance towards non-conformists had been the primary and fundamental approach, with the result that there was never any undue or unjustified emphasis on religion being the approach to the State proper. What I am trying to drive at is that we never found, under the Hindu organisation of State, a situation similar to what the Muslim invaders of India had created, e.g., collection of *jizia* (poll tax from infidel Hindus), forcible conversion to Islam, compelling the non-conformists at the point of the sword to eschew his vegetarianism and to eat beef, and a host of other crude but apparently very delectable approaches to what, shall I say, the early *Caliphs* sought to have in terms of the *millats* within their territories.

I have absolutely no desire to whitewash the crudities of the Hindu type of approach to social organisation and the polity of the community and the State, but I would not be true to myself, as a born Hindu with some pretensions to the knowledge of the sacerdotal forms of approach to religion and its

implications to the community, if I do not unhesitatingly emphasize the point that tolerance to non-conformity, which might range from eclecticism to atheism, has been the basic approach of Hinduism to the individual, the community and the State. If today there are certain historical anachronisms, *e.g.*, the *devasthans* and a fastly crumbling organisation of society on the basis of the caste system, the attitude of a patriotic Hindu towards them must necessarily be one of reverent indifference.

In my time, I have taken an intimate part in *Harijan* work, and for four years lived in the midst of *Harijans*, losing, as a penalty for this "crime", the right to the Hindu sacrament in the eyes of what I may term the obscurantist *pundits*, who parrot-like continue to repeat uncomprehended dry texts of ancient Hinduism, but I am convinced that this is not the approach to life and living today of the average Hindu. A decade ago, after the historic Poona Pact which saved Gandhiji's life, it was a period of high expectation about a complete reorganisation and reconstruction of Hindu society, and Mahatma Gandhi undertook on foot his *Harijan* tour of Orissa. It was his programme to get access to the Hindu temples and *devasthans* for the *Harijans* of the land, since they were endowed either by the king or by the community in a distant past, which cannot be ascertained with sufficient clarity these days. There were sanguinary incidents when some of the *savarna* (high caste) temples were approached by the so-called untouchables of the land, even though, at a later stage, a single procla-

mation of a Hindu prince had statutorily given them the right of entry to these institutions of history and hoary religion in the State of Travancore. I remember receiving, on behalf of the *Harijan* community of Vizagapatam, Mahatma Gandhi, after the completion of his Orissa tour ten years ago, and even today I vividly recall the almost unbelievable surprise of Mahatma Gandhi when it was arranged that he should open a beautiful temple built by the *Harijans* for themselves, for I believed, even at that time, the need for a change of heart, and that the highest of the high must go down to the level of the lowest of the low, if such had ever existed within the fold of Hinduism proper, in the communion of a common prayer to the Maker, that society be preserved in terms of harmony and fellowship. I am quite sure that the fellow Brahman who, like myself, had the courage to perform the religious ceremonies necessary for the formal opening of a Hindu temple for the *Harijans*, must have been thrown to the wolves by the Hindu pharisees, who are available unfortunately in our midst by the million even today. But the fact remains that I, as a self-respecting individual and a born high caste Hindu, meaning thereby the *vaidik* Brahman, would sooner have a *regime* of things in which I would descend to the levels of the lowest of the low (believe me, not with any sense of haughty condescension), than spoil for some sort of civil strife, simply because the so-called untouchable approaches, even with humility, these institutions of history and religion. But this is an

organisational question which I need not pursue here at any greater length.

I have said that Hinduism would not have survived the onslaughts from without of the most aggressive type, but for its catholicity and that undefinable something which gives it a vitality all its own, unmatched either in Christendom or Islam. A great Muslim divine, whose piety and skill are recognised even by the *Al-Azhar* University at Cairo, not to speak of Islam wherever it exists today, had attempted to give his considered opinion upon religion in our midst, and I cannot do better than quote this appraisal which, I am sure, every Hindu and Muslim in this country would endorse. This is what Maulana Abul Kalam Azad said: "It was India's historical destiny that many human races and cultures and religions should flow to her, finding a home in her hospitable soil, and that many caravans should rest here..... One of the last of these caravans, following the foot-steps of its predecessors, was that of the followers of Islam..... This led to a meeting of the culture currents of two different races: Like the Ganges and the Jumna, they flowed for a while through separate courses. But Nature's immutable law brought them together and joined them in a *sangam*. The thousand years of our joint life have moulded us into a common nationality. This cannot be done artificially. Nature does her fashioning through her hidden processes in the course of centuries. Whether we like it or not, we have now become an Indian nation, united and indivisible. No artificial scheming to separate and divide will break this unity."

Political considerations have led to the emergence of a mediéval type of religious approach to rear its head in our midst today, as the only basis for the Hindu and the Muslim to settle their differences, but this phase is now passing. But it is clear that the sword of religion behind Islam had long since ceased to be the motive force behind statecraft, in the same fashion in which the sword of religion behind Hinduism, when it first came into contact with what I have called the animism of the inhabitants of this country in a hoary past which is now almost shrouded in mystery, had vanished into thin air. It may be a trifle unpleasant for an Indian patriot to dig up the past of Islam, even only for the purpose of showing that the sword of religion had been sheathed and securely locked up for centuries together, even in the countries of the Holy Prophet (Peace be on Him) and of the Caliphs. But I must attempt such an analysis and appraisal with reference to the Islamic past, and with the assistance of indisputable authorities in the English language, for I have not that pretence to knowledge of the Arabic and the Persian texts which I might, with a sense of *faux-pas* in my idiotic moments, try to claim along with the countless numbers of *Pandits* and *Mullahs* in respect of Hinduism.

An appraisal of the early foundations of the Muslim State—whether it be under the Omayyads, the Ottomans or the Moguls—is appropriate in this place for our argument. From Baghdad
MUSLIM
JIHAD to Cordova, from Kabul to Imphal,
Muslim rule spread itself out in the historical

period with the crusading fervour of the *jiḥād*. From the Battle of the Pavements in France to the sack of Delhi by Ahmad Shah Abdali, it was one long and even sordid story of an attempt to secure the extermination of the *kaffir*, be he White or Brown, or in the alternative his forcible conversion to Islam, or his persecution.

But I pay my tribute to Islam, despite its medieval characteristics of a theocratic or religious state, for what it has given to the world and to me in terms of a highly organised system of medicine, mathematics and historiography, and for the manner in which it stood four square for long centuries, against the counter crusades of Christendom, until the emergence of European powers as maritime nations and the discovery of gunpowder as the principal achievement of Christian alchemy led to the ultimate political destruction of Constantinople and the gradual dismemberment of the Omayyad dynasty. Unless I am grossly mistaken, it would appear that triumphant Christianity had learnt its lesson from the failure of Islam to maintain a theocratic state and dominion over the conquered territories, which had at one time spread all over the Mediterranean littoral, whether it be Egypt, Morocco, Spain, France or even Italy. I believe it is the verdict of history that the failure of the Muslim *regime* of the *zimmī* or *kaffir* and of the crusades of Christendom against Islam is responsible for the elimination of religion as the principal adjunct to the evolution of the State, as conceived and maintained by the Western Imperial Powers which, at any rate during the past

three centuries following in the wake of the destruction of Islam as an international political power, had come to rule the world, but for the temporary interlude of the past three years represented by the Japanese occupation of South-East Asia, which claims millions of Muslims who live in complete isolation from their compeers in India and the Near East.

Coming nearer home, ever since the first Arab set his foot on the soil of Sind 1,200 years ago, till the fall of Bahadur Shah to the guns of the East India Company nearly two hundred years ago, there were one or two features of importance which I must notice. The long years of Ghazni and Ghori and the sack of Somnath, conformed to the pristine tradition of the Muslim *jihad* and the extermination of the Hindu *kaffir* and his forms of worship, in order that the Muslim way of life was accepted by every living individual on the face of the earth. Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali represented the special type of Muslim buccaneers, who were out for the loot of the rich plains of Hindustan, though they were certainly good Muslims and genuinely believed that by their work they would be going to their pre-ordained Vallalah, if in the process of loot and destruction they also destroyed the *kaffir* and his religion, and claimed him, even at the point of the sword, to Islam. Let me now pause for a little while here to review the centuries of Mogul rule proper in our midst. Emphasis on the *kaffir-nexus* of the activities of the early Mogul rulers was there in unmistakable form, but the Moguls had come to

stay in India and, strangely enough, had stayed, with the result that the purity of Arab blood, as the concomitant of Islam, was no longer sought to be maintained, and intermarriages with *kaffirs* took place by the million, from the Emperor down to the rank and file of his freebooters and buccaneers. By the time Akbar became the Emperor of India, most of the Muslim established churches of the country were losing their momentum, and the organised State was coming gradually to the creed of such of the *kaffirs* themselves who were able to maintain their individuality and religion, despite the ever-pervading grip of the Muslim rulers. Akbar himself proclaimed his principle of religious neutrality which he had so eloquently enshrined in his creed *Din Ilahi*, and a *firman* issued by Emperor Aurangzeb (who is popularly misrepresented as the most notorious Hindu-baiter) is still extant which shows that this most puritanical Muslim Ruler of India respected Hindu sentiment and ordered the protection of the cow.*

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who is not a friend of the Hindus (*Thoughts on Pakistan*), premises that *Pakistan* and *Hindustan* had existed side by side in India during the twelve hundred years, from the time Mohammad Bin Qasim who conquered Sind in 712 A.D. There are in this book passages taken from contemporary Muslim evangelical literature, and I must emphasise the "evangelical" aspect of the adventures of the Tartars, the Afghans and the Moguls—the three main currents of Muslim invasion of India, which

* See my book *Cow Protection In India*, South Indian Humanitarian League, Madras, 1927.

Dr. Ambedkar postulates to terrify the present-day Indian out of his wits, and to demonstrate the efficacy of the *jihad* as practised by Ghazni, Ghorî, Aibak, Timur and Aurangzeb, which included infliction of slaughter, rape, the forcible conversion and spoliation of the economic status of Hindus by the invaders, who came and went during the chequered period of the long years of history represented by the so-called Muslim conquest of India. There is one curious passage in Dr. Ambedkar's book, which, however, knocks the bottom out of the entire basis of this argument about the predatory and punitive type of conquest and administration of India by the early Muslims. Here it is (pp. 50-51): "These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions of India, as they were wars among the Muslims themselves. This fact has remained hidden, because the invaders are all lumped together as Muslims without distinction. But as a matter of fact they were Tartars, Afghans and Moghuls. Mohammad Ghazni was a Tartar, Mohammad Ghorî was a Moghul, Timur was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, and Nadir Shah and Ahmadshah Abdali were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was out to destroy the Tartar, and the Mongol was out to destroy both the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving family cemented by the feeling of Islamic brotherhood. They were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often wars of mutual extermination." If this was the statement of one of the protagonists among non-Muslims of India in favour of the Two-Nation theory, it is a present

to the iconoclast *Pakistanites* in this country, and it is also an adverse testimony from one of their staunch admirers and supporters in their grand drive towards the dismemberment of this country. In fairness to Dr. Ambedkar, I must, however, quote the remaining three lines from the paragraph preserved above. He says : "What is, however, important to bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts, they were all united by one common objective, and that was to destroy the Hindu faith."

I have tried to wade through the four hundred pages of Dr. Ambedkar's book of diatribes and half-truths in order to find his basic conclusions. In one sentence he sums up his position (page 347): "It is true I have not given any finding." But any Indian reader going through this sustained attack upon the territorial and political integrity of India, can give the finding himself from the tables of statistics preserved by Dr. Ambedkar, whose scholarship and hard work cannot be impugned. According to him, the computation of Muslim population of Indian provinces is in the aggregate 25.9 per cent, and of Indian States, again in the aggregate, 12.7 per cent. These percentages vary from 1.09 in Orissa, to 73.7 in Sind, and from .01 per cent. in Sikkim to 97.5 per cent. in Baluchistan States. Dr. Ambedkar gives a series of maps naming the "Muslim" areas to the west and east of India. He marks thirteen districts of the present province of the Punjab as Hindu (he does not mention Sikhs at all in this connection). In regard to Bengal and Assam, he lists twenty-two districts of both the Provinces, which literally hem in the

fourteen Muslim districts in terms of a horse shoe, with three areas represented by feudatory States, for which he does not give any population composition. I have tried to obtain enlightenment from Dr. Ambedkar as to what he would do, or what the *Pakistanites* would do, with some of the Muslim States like Hyderabad in which the Muslim population is only 10.4 per cent. But, of course, it is a very inconvenient question, which neither Dr. Ambedkar, nor any of the fanatical Muslims who want their territorial share out of this country, can possibly care to answer.

Muhammad Asad, an Austrian convert to Islam, whom the late Allama Iqbal characterised as a very powerful thinker, says: "Islamic civilization is the most complete form of theocracy history has ever known" (*Islam at the Crossroads*, p. 31). He further says: ".....The very foundations of modern Western Civilization are incompatible with Islam. This should in no way preclude the possibility of Muslims receiving from the West certain impulses in the domain of exact and applied sciences; but their cultural relations should begin and end at that point. To go further, to imitate the Western Civilization in its spirit, its mode of life and its social organisation is impossible, without giving a vital blow to the very existence of Islam as a theocratic polity and practical religion" (*italics mine*) (p. 55).

Mohamed Abdullah Enan, Assistant Director, Press Department, Ministry of the Interior, Cairo, (*Decisive Moments in the History of Islam*), discussing the religious policy of the Arabs, clearly indicates

the early principles of Muslim *jihad*, including the forcible conversion of the *zimmis* (non-Muslims, particularly of the Near East, Spain, etc.) and gives an eloquent account of long centuries of Islamic tradition of the earlier type, which believed in forcible conversion, and collection of *jizia* (tribute). He quotes one of the letters of the second Caliph Omar, under whose regime the political tenets of Islam were stated to be as follows: "The Zimmis must be sealed in the neck with lead; they must show their belts, shave their beards and ride their mounts aside. The *jizia* (tribute) is to be imposed only on those who are already shaved (adults); it must not be imposed on women or boys. The Zimmis are not allowed to dress themselves in the same manner as the Moslems" (p. 18). Earlier, Enan declares that "the non-Moslem peoples were always considered by Moslem society as inferior from the social point of view; in the fields of public life they were deprived of the protection, respect and pride which the Moslem enjoyed. This distinction dates from the early days of Islam; it was officially designed and laid down by state" (pp. 17-18).

But surveying the entire history of the phenomenal Muslim expansion in the West, including Spain, France and Italy, under the early Caliphs, particularly prior to the onrush of the Christian Crusades, Enan indicates the unmistakable manner in which the Caliphate system found itself beaten in its religious policy towards the *zimmis*, and comes to the conclusion that the early evangelistic and even militant religious approach of the Omayyads

gradually gave place to a regime of toleration towards non-conformists. There is, however, this curious passage in Enan's survey: "Thus, this peaceful and enlightened policy, adopted by the Governments of the Caliphs towards its new subjects, led at first to gaining their support through religious tolerance, and their material help through payment of tribute, and then at last to their embracing Islam and thus securing their moral and material support at the same time. Thus, it appears that the spread of Islam with this overwhelming rapidity was not always in conformity with the policy of the Caliphate and that it was, at one time, prejudicial to its material interests. This throws light on an astounding historical fact denied or misrepresented by most of the western writers who write on Islam, and on the methods of its diffusion and the causes of its being so deeply rooted; it also explains how the Government of the Caliphs was, at the same time, an autocracy grasping all authority in its hands and a lenient instrument which gave way to liberal and democratic principles [sic]" (pp. 25-26).

The Wahabi Movement, which started early in the XIX century in this country as one of the puritanical developments of thought in Islam, was a tremendous force in modern political Islam in our midst. W. Cantwell Smith writes (*Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis*). "In the revolt against the Sikhs in the Punjab, and in the various uprisings against the British there and in Bengal, they proclaimed a *jihad* against the infidel, and appealed not only to the oppressed to unite against their exploiters, but to

the Muslims to unite for the defence of their religion. *None of these political activities, however, was anti-Hindu.*" (*italios mine*) (p. 189).

W. W. Hunter in his sympathetic book '*The Indian Mussalmans*' (p. 107), referring to the Wahabi uprising around Calcutta in 1831, states that they "broke into the houses of Muslim and Hindu landlords with perfect impartiality". He indicates, however, that the upper class Muslims opposed these peasant rioters in search of an *egalitarian* society, with the result that the *fatwas* of the Muslim divines were directed against them for long decades. This is what Cantwell Smith writes (pp. 189-190). "The Wahabi Movement, therefore, did not set lower-class Muslims against lower class Hindus in open conflict, nor did it divert lower class Muslims from economic issues to a false solidarity with their communal friends but class enemies. Nonetheless, it did encourage communal attitudes, especially in religious thinking, and left a considerable section of the Muslim masses more susceptible to later communist propaganda than they might otherwise have been. The Mutiny, like the political *jihads* of the Wahabis, emphasized the Muslim community of India as a religio-political unit, but at the same time emphasized co-operation between that community and the Hindus in the face of a common enemy."

Khuda Baksh (*Studies: Indian and Islamic*, p. 32) writing in 1912 in emphasis of the need for Indian unity exhorted the people: "May the Muslim solidarity—for purposes Indian—be merged into a higher, nobler Indian solidarity, mightily single". He

further says (*Essays: Indian and Islamic*, p. 20), that these principles have been lost sight of by Indian Muslims, and I have to reckon with a series of developments in our midst which have had such catastrophic results these days.

For any proper appraisal of the manner in which the earlier iconoclasm and militant religious basis of Islam in India had spent its force, and the Muslims settled down in the country to the cultivation of the arts of peace and stability and co-equal partnership with non-Muslims, in the sharing of the burdens of statehood or nationhood, an examination must be made here of the lasting influence of the life and work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement, represented by him, Wiquar-ul Mulk, Nazir Ahmed, Shibli and Hali. My comprehension of Urdu literature is severely handicapped, and I quote below from Dr. S. M. Abdullah's book entitled "*The Spirit and Substance of Urdu Prose under the Influence of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan*," to which the late Allama Iqbal wrote an appreciative foreword. I believe my Muslim friends in India would not dispute the authenticity of the quotations given below from this very important publication.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in his monumental publication "*Tafsir-ul-Quran*" "violently criticised the idea of *jihad* of an aggressive nature so commonly prevalent among the Muslims. According to him, all the wars fought by the Prophet of Islam were defensive, and there is no injunction in the Holy Quran favouring the popular view of *jihad*" (p. 29). Shibli in his "*Sirat-un-Nabi*" also emphasised this

point and declared that "all the wars fought by the Holy Prophet were defensive" (p.130). Nazir Ahmed in his book "*Huquq Wal-Faraid*" stated: "the conditions necessitating such a war (*jihad*) do not exist under the British Government" (p. 51).

Shibli Numani answering in the affirmative the question whether Islam can exist in the face of the present advancement of science and civilization, is stated to have affirmed that Islam ensures "absolute cultural autonomy for religious minorities in a Muslim state, in so far as they do not interfere with existing law and order", (p. 60).

The progressive invasion of racialism over Islam is, however, indicated by the following passages relating to Sir Syed: "his interest in the international political movement, 'pan-Islamism', was intensified and, last of all, his experience and knowledge of other countries further stimulated in him the desire to revive modern Islamic society on a broader and a more rational basis" (p. 110). Shibli in "*Ilm'ul-Kalam*", answering the question why there were so many classes in Islam, "traces the causes of this, one of which was the dominating influence of Politics over Thought"(p. 57). Tracing the evolution of the ideas of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, particularly as a consequence of the development of his mind resulting from his visit to London in 1869 and the Aligarh Movement in general, Dr. Abdullah says that "while he sympathised with Indian aspirations, he seceded from the Indian National Congress and exhorted his co-religionists to remain aloof from its activities. He was a liberal politician, but above all

he was interested in the education of his own community. To achieve this, the *most cordial relations with the Government were considered essential*, (*italics mine*) (p. 19).

The late Sir Mohammad Iqbal, according to Cantwell Smith (*Modern Islam in India—A Social Analysis*, p. 12) "looked upon aggressive warfare as one of the horrors of modern civilization, and he criticized land-hungry *jihad* even in Islam. He used to say that the greatest misfortune of Islam was when it became an Empire."

Iqbal's abhorrence of the then prevailing "pathetic piety" of the people is summed up in the following exhortation of his: "Go and fight, commands the Quran. Fight the devil in your bosom first.....and fight the evil outside.....Fight the devil of dirt and uncleanness in your surroundings, fight the devils of disease and poverty, fight malaria, fight plague, fight cholera, fight ignorance and illiteracy, fight the fat capitalist who defrauds and exploits the poor, fight the religious hypocrite who cheats the people under his cloak of piety, fight those who deprive you of your birthright of free manhood" (*ibid* p. 130).

Islam in India, during the past hundred years in particular, had to discharge the twin task of modernisation and reconstruction internally, and to link up with contemporaneous religious movements in the world, in other words, with pan-Islamism. I have already referred to the efforts of a century of the Wahabi Movement, in the course of which we have seen the ruthless manner in which the vested interests of orthodox theological leaders and the rich

among the Muslim community in the country attempted to thwart any horizontal integration of Indian Muslim society. I have already adverted to the manner in which the Aligarh School of Islamic thought tried to infuse racialism into the ethics and polity of Indian Islam, in order that Muslims in this country get their roots firmly implanted into the earth and, as a corollary, to retrieve the position they had lost at the time of the British conquests of the country, whether it be in the field of economic rehabilitation, political consciousness or cultural progress.

I am not here concerned with the insidious efforts of the British rulers of the country to divide the ranks of nationalist forces available to us, whether it be in respect of the efforts of Lord Minto at the dawn of the present century or of Lord Chelmsford at the conclusion of the last Great War, who artificially sought to put up "stooges" as propounders of the separatist political movement in this country in favour of the Muslim interests as distinct from those of India as a whole. But any one who knows the green-room tactics at the time of the Minto-Morley reforms and the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of the present century would readily recognise that Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan and his Aligarh Movement were not only inspired and financed but also controlled by the Government of India and their agents, but were the lineal predecessors of His Highness the Aga Khan and others. The manner in which our British masters have succeeded in keeping up this separatist agitation in India on the part of certain

Muslims, mostly through a horrible system of political spoils, has been kept up right through the course of the last quarter of a century, and including the rigmarole connected with the Simon Commission, the Round Table Conference and the Joint Select Committee, leading to the passing of the Constitution Act of 1935. Until the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League in 1940, when *Pakistan* became an integral creed of Muslim League politics, even the moderate Muslims of the country, who looked more to Government patronage than to loyalty of their co-religionists and the goodwill of their fellow subjects of other countries resident in the land, got disillusioned to such an extent, that today the sense of frustration, which has crippled the activities of the Indian nationalists during the past half a century, also came to invade the activities of the Muslim title seekers and job hunters, alongside of their Hindu compeers. When the history of modern times comes to be written, the verdict will be given that even *Quide Azam* Jinnah was influenced by the politics of *divide et impera* pursued by the authorities, but this is not a tract on Muslim League politics, with the result that I must proceed with an empirical examination of the evolution of the ideas of Muslim politics based on religion in this country.

The other twin aspect of the reconstructional activities of modern Islam in India is represented by the *pan-Islamic* approach of its leaders, as an escape from the realities of the loss of freedom, which emanated from the British succession to Muslim Emperors of the land. It is one of the most curious developments

of modern political thought and activity that Indian Muslims had come to recognise the need for considering themselves as the custodians of the fortunes of Islam outside India. There was the classic example of the oratory of that tub-thumper, Mr. Jamnadas Mehta, who today is the representative of the Government of India accredited to the *emigre* Government of Burma in Simla, when he cried hoarse in trying to convince the world that at the time of the *Khilafat* Movement twenty-five years ago in this country, both Gandhiji and the Ali Brothers invited ex-King Amanullah to invade our homes. Only lunatics in this country can believe a proposition like this, for the simple reason that the resources of ex-King Amanullah to invade India and to eject the British from out of our midst were too puny to be effective.

Pan-Islamism, however, continues to be one of the most profound influences affecting the political activity of Indian Mussalmans, despite the repeated rebuffs they have received, sometimes from their own co-religionists abroad, for example, from the late Ataturk; and consistently from His Majesty's Government during the fateful years of the inter-war period and up to the present day. I consider a short review of the origin and growth of the *pan-Islamic* movement and the futility attending upon the urge for external expression, before obtaining internal strength, on the part of certain sections of the Muslim community in this land, will serve a very useful purpose, that is to say, in the building up of the foundations of a secular State in this country, in

which the Hindu and the Muslim can co-operate towards securing the common task of liberating the Mother Country and towards establishing her position in the world of politics of tomorrow.

To the evolution of Islamic thought in India during the past half a century, Sir Mohammed Iqbal's contribution must be considered to be particularly important. This Indian poet of Islam has gone through varying moods and ideas before he arrived at the goal of *Pakistan* as a central concept of Muslim religio-politics in this country. The sense of frustration which the Indian Muslims came to feel during the fateful years marking the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, both on account of an assault from without and the assault from within, was the cause of this poesy of frustration, so eloquently illustrated by the *Shikwa* and *Jawab-i-Shikwa* of Allama Iqbal. The ideas of *jihad* and *zimmis* continue to hold that fascination which early Muslim crusaders and buccaneers possessed, but, if I do not do injustice to the memory of the late Allama Iqbal, these aggressive chantings of religious poetry really intended to take the Indian Muslim back to the hoary days of triumphant international Islam, which today, however, cannot be revived with all its unsullied glory.

Allama Iqbal begins his *Shikwa* with

".....'tis none but God Himself
whom I, in sorrow, must arraign!"
(1-3)

Iqbal's arraignment takes the form of a recapitulation of the former triumphs of Islam in the West and

(IV-3)

(V-3)

(VI-3)

(IX-2)

(X-1)

"Yet see how still Thy bounties rain
On roofs of unbelieving clans,